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Abstract
We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying
large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed
information on individual MEPs between 2004 and 2011, we find that the reform, which
comes with an exceptional increase of, on average, 200 percent per national delegation, has
a positive incentive effect on in-office effort as approximated by engagement in speeches,
written declarations and drafted reports. However, a higher remuneration increases absence.
With respect to political selection, we find that a higher remuneration increases re-election
rates. The composition of the pool of MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality approximated with
formal education, previous political experience and occupational background is, however,
unaffected. If we restrict our attention to freshmen, we find that a higher remuneration is
related to a lower fraction of MEPs with previous political experience at the highest national
level.
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1 Introduction
There are two complementary perspectives on the role of institutions in political economy. On
the one hand, institutions serve as devices to discipline the behavior of political agents. On the
other hand, institutions serve as selection devices. This is relevant because the electoral control
of politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited and thus the identity of
politicians matters for political outcomes.1 Recent research aims at better understanding which
institutional conditions systematically impact the selection of politicians with heterogeneous
quality characteristics in the first place.
In this paper, we want to bridge the traditional view on institutions impacting the discipline of
politicians and the complementary view emphasizing that the same institutions systematically
affect the selection into politics. We focus on the remuneration of politicians as one such impor-
tant institutional condition. We exploit the exceptional remuneration reform in the European
Parliament (EP) in 2009 involving an increase of the base remuneration of, on average, 200%
per national delegation.2 We investigate whether a higher remuneration increases the in-office
effort of politicians and leads to a selection of better qualified politicians.
We pursue three goals with our contribution. First, using the exogenous variation in changes
in pay across national delegations, we study the monetary impact on discipline. In particular,
we analyze a broad set of measures of in-office effort ranging from absenteeism to engagement
in legislative activities. Second, regarding the relationship between pay and selection, we study
three important dimensions of quality characteristics; i.e., formal education, previous political
and occupational experience. Third, while there is growing literature on how the pool of national
or local political assemblies is composed, political economists and political scientists alike have
paid relatively little attention to the analysis of the politicians at the supranational level. We,
therefore, thoroughly document who is elected to the EP between 2004 and 2011.3
The harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) constitutes an exceptional empirical set up to study the relationship between pay,
1For a review of general ideas on the importance of selection in politics, see Fearon (1999), Brennan and Hamlin
(2000), Besley (2005) and Mansbridge (2009). Recent research presents evidence showing that the identity of
politicians matters for political outcomes; e.g., Jones and Olken (2005), Besley et al. (2011) and Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004).
2We discuss previous work on the relationship between pay, discipline and selection in politics separately in
Section II.
3Survey-based exceptions in political science are Scarrow (1997), Norris and Franklin (1997), Hobold and
Hoyland (2011), and Hoyland et al. (2009). There are some political science studies that describe candidate
selection for European elections in particular countries; i.e., Krasovec and Stremfel (2007) for Slovenia, Linek and
Outly (2006) for the Czech Republic, Kauppi (1996) for France, and Gherghina and Chiru (2010) for Romania.
Meserve et al. (2012) explore determinants of party list positioning of candidates in the European election in
2009 for twelve countries.
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discipline and selection in politics. Up to 2009, MEPs were paid out of the national budget
and received the same base remuneration as their colleagues in the national parliaments. This
involved large differences between the 27 national delegations. For example, at the beginning
of the sixth legislative period; i.e., the pre-harmonization period (2004-2009), a MEP from the
Hungarian delegation received 10,080 Euros of annual base remuneration, whereas a MEP from
the Italian delegation was conceded 144,084 Euros. In 2005, the European Parliament and the
European Council enacted a new statute for the Members of the European Parliament and from
July 2009 onwards (as of the beginning of the seventh legislative period), all MEPs receive the
identical base remuneration which is 91,983 Euros in 2009. The remuneration is now paid out
of the European Union budget and is fixed to 38.5% of the base remuneration of a judge of the
European Court of Justice. All other components of the remuneration package, such as per-diem
allowances for session attendance and reimbursements for travelling or staff have been paid out
of the EU budget before and after 2009 and are unaffected by the harmonization.
The question of how to approximate individual discipline and quality in politics is subject to
on-going research (see Padovano 2012 for a discussion). As regards discipline or performance,
we look at four different in-office effort measures - all being individually attributable. First, we
analyze absenteeism, often used as a proxy for effort and shirking. Second, we more specifically
investigate legislative effort and study the engagement in plenary speeches, written declarations
and drafting reports. Delivering speeches is an inherent part of the (representation) duties of
a politician. The written declaration is a means to initiate parliamentary attention on matters
of concern. The drafting of legislative reports is the most important individual instrument to
influence legislating as reports that pass the voting are adopted into EU law. With respect to
quality, we build and extend on the previous literature and concentrate on three dimensions
of (ex-ante) quality characteristics; i.e., formal education, previous elected political experience
and previous occupation.4 Formal education is a proxy for ability in the private sector and
is arguably positively related to ability in the political sector. Previous political experience
hints at the role of elections as filters for quality (see Cooter 2002). We assume that an elected
position at a higher level of government indicates higher and revealed political quality (or at
least more relevant political experience). In addition, we look at previous occupation and focus
on two groups; i.e., the MEPs with a previous occupation close to the political sector and
high-skill occupations (e.g., university professors, senior public officials, liberal professions and
entrepreneurs). The former group brings in the required knowledge and understanding of the
political process. The reasoning for the latter group focuses more on revealed ability outside
politics.5
4Besley (2005) argues that quality in politics essentially comprises two aspects: competence and honesty. We
focus on the former aspect and use the terms (ex-ante) quality and competence interchangeably.
5We are aware that these dimensions partly overlap. However, we want to capture a broad spectrum of
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Based on our thoroughly collected panel dataset on the MEPs between 2004 and 2011, we exploit
the enormous variation in the change of the base remuneration and apply a fixed effects model
controlling for time-invariant and country-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For the reform,
which is not accompanied by any other institutional change, we find a positive incentive effect
on in-office legislative effort as approximated by engagement in speeches, written declarations
and drafted reports. For example, a 10% increase in base remuneration is related to a 1.1%
increase in the number of drafted reports on average. However, a higher base remuneration is
related to more absence. With respect to political selection, we find that a higher remuneration
increases the re-election rate. Doubling the base remuneration increases the probability of re-
election by 17.7 percentage points. The composition of the MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality
approximated with formal education, previous political experience and occupational background
is, however, unaffected by the exceptional remuneration reform. If we restrict our attention to
freshmen, we find that a higher base remuneration is related to a lower fraction of MEPs with
previous political experience at the highest national level. For formal education and previous
occupational background, again, no selection effect is found for the restricted sample.
Our results support the traditional view that the institutional conditions determining the re-
muneration in politics matter for disciplining political agents. Little support is found for the
(short-run) importance of the remuneration rule in systematically impacting political selection.
This finding, however, seems to be partly driven by competition forces that benefit the incum-
bents and result in lower turnover. In addition, one should pay attention to the European
proportional electoral rule and the correspondingly strong role of national parties in nominat-
ing candidates which weaken the (self-)selection arguments emphasized by the citizen candidate
approach.
Closest to our study is parallel work by Fisman et al. (2012) and Altindag and Mocan (2011)
who also investigate this unique empirical set up. Mocan and Altindag (2011) restrict their
attention to the relationship between the base remuneration and absence and find a positive
relationship. Fisman et al. (2012) study discipline and selection and overlap with our inde-
pendent contribution. While they focus more on the analysis of effort and shirking, we center
around selection. In particular, based on a more detailed data set regarding individual MEP
characteristics, we provide an in-depth analysis of the composition and selection effects of the
reform on three rather than one ex-ante quality dimensions and provide new results. In contrast
to Fisman et al. (2012), we do not find that the increase in base remuneration decreases the
quality of politicians in terms of education. We find similar results on incumbency. However,
our results differ regarding in-office effort. While they find no systematic relationship between
pay, absence and effort, we find that a higher pay is related to more engagement in legislative
activities and, at the same time, to more absence.
observable background indicators in education, in politics as well as outside politics.
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Section 2 sets the stage and briefly discusses previous research on the relationship between pay,
discipline and selection in politics. Section 3 deals with the institutional background. Section 4
presents the data. In Section 5, the empirical analysis is conducted. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous literature
In the predominant perspective in political economics, the effect of salaries on a politician’s
discipline and performance has been analyzed in political agency models. In a recent model
by Besley (2004) with the possibility of re-election, politicians are more likely to abstain from
rent-seeking activities and behave more in congruence with citizens’ preferences as the value of
office-holding increases.6
As regards recent empirical contributions, Ferraz and Finan (2009) analyze an exogenous varia-
tion in the pay of local politicians across Brazilian municipalities for elections held in 2000 and
2004. They implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to use the discontinuities in pay
depending on municipality population size thresholds to identify the causal effect of pay on per-
formance. They find that a higher salary improves the in-office performance of local politicians
as approximated with bill sponsorship and the provision of local public infrastructure (educa-
tion and health). For Italian mayors, Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) find consistent evidence
in a similar empirical set-up. Implementing a sharp regression discontinuity design, they find
that mayors with higher salaries reduce the size of the municipal government and increase local
bureaucratic efficiency.7 Furthermore, the study exploits term limits in order to disentangle the
selection and the incentive effects that pay has on in-office performance. Interestingly, most of
the improved performance is driven by selection.
How the pay of politicians influences the incentive to run for political office and thus the com-
position of the pool of politicians has just recently been addressed by political economists.8
Theoretical contributions are presented by Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner
and Pohlborn (2004), Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) providing
ambiguous predictions. Caselli and Morelli (2004); e.g., present a citizen-candidate model. One
central result is that a higher relative pay in politics increases the average quality of politicians,
as candidates with higher opportunity costs (self-)select into politics. In contrast, Messner and
Pohlborn (2004) show that for intermediate levels of pay, another (indirect) effect may domi-
6An early contribution discussing salary as a disciplining device in politics is Barro (1973).
7Earlier contributions supporting the positive relationship between remuneration and discipline/performance
in politics are Di Tella and Fisman (2004) and Besley (2004) who look at U.S. governors.
8Further institutions that have been addressed so far include the regime type (Besley and Reynal-Querol
2011), electoral rules and parties (Galasso and Nannicini 2011, Mattozzi and Merlo 2011), institutions enhancing
transparency in politics (Gehlbach et al. 2010, Rosenson 2006), and institutions which govern the dual office
holding in different branches of government (Braendle and Stutzer 2010, 2011).
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nate when pay is increased; i.e., a higher probability that candidates of low-quality with lower
opportunity costs run increases the incentive for the candidates of high quality to free ride on
low-quality candidates by not running for political office. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) intro-
duce a two party system and costly campaigning that generates informative but noisy signals
about the quality of candidates. They show that the positive relationship between pay and the
average quality of politicians also need not hold and depends on the level of campaigning costs.
Few contributions address this question empirically. Ferraz and Finan (2009) show that higher
pay improves the quality of local candidates and elected politicians as approximated by education
(average years of school attendance and the share with a high-school degree) and previous
profession (a larger fraction of politicians with high opportunity costs; i.e., more lawyers and
businessmen are attracted). Moreover, higher pay increases political competition indicated by
more citizens who run for political office. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) provide consistent
evidence for Italian mayors; i.e., a higher salary attracts candidates with higher opportunity costs
as approximated by years of schooling and a white collar professional background. This selection
effect also carries over to the elected mayors. As regards the size of the effect, Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013) find; e.g., that a 33% higher pay for mayors increases the average years of
schooling by about 6.2%. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) analyze an increase in politicians’
pay on the national level. Applying a differences-in-differences approach to an increase of 35% in
Finnish parliamentary pay and using candidates in local elections as control group, they find a
five percentage points higher fraction of female candidates with university education. No effect,
however, is found for male candidates.9
For the exceptional remuneration reform at the European level, we want to test the predominant
hypotheses. In particular, we test whether increases in pay lead to more in-office effort and to
the selection of better qualified politicians. We analyze a broad set of in-office effort measures
to evaluate the impact of pay on discipline. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of the
selection effect of the reform on the quality of elected politicians.
3 European Parliament
Electoral system
Since the European Parliament was founded in 1979, direct elections take place every five years.
Up to the European elections in 1999, it was composed of 15 national delegations. In 2004,
9Closely related questions are whether higher pay impacts the incentive to rerun (see Groseclose and Krehbiel
1994 and Keane and Merlo 2010) and whether outside or post-office earning possibilities also play a role for the
decision to enter politics (see the first contribution by Gagliarducci et al. 2010 for outside earnings and Diermeier
et al. 2005 and Eggers and Hainmueller 2009 for post-office returns).
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ten new East European countries joined and in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU.
In the 6th (2004-2009) and 7th legislative period (2009-2014), the European Parliament consists
of 785 and 736 seats, respectively. Before Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Parlia-
ment in 2007, the European Parliament had 732 MEP seats in the 6th legislative period. As a
proportional representation electoral system is applied, the smallest number of seats is assigned
to the delegation from Malta; i.e., five and the largest number is held by Germany with 99
seats. All member countries apply proportional representation electoral systems which differ in
their specificities as regards closed versus open list proportional representation, minimum vote
requirements, party nomination monopolies and rules on (simultaneous) dual office holding in
the European and national political arena.10 As far as we observed, all of these specific insti-
tutions of the national electoral system remained fixed within our observation period. By and
large, the election to the EP is based on the national party systems and in combination with
the proportional representation electoral system allows for a strong role for the national party
in nominating candidates.11
Legislative competencies
Most EU law and regulatory issues are decided by the co-decision procedure. This implies that
the European Parliament together with the European Council have the power to pass the budget
and to adopt and amend EU legislation in many policy areas, such as immigration, energy,
transport, environment, consumer and labor protection.12 Apart from voting, individual MEPs
have several instruments at hand to influence the legislative decision-making process. The major
means is the drafting of legislative reports where MEPs, called the rapporteurs, are entrusted by
the responsible committee with improving or amending proposals brought in by the European
Commission.13 In addition to submitting reports, MEPs can influence the legislative process by
putting; e.g., written declarations to initiate legislative attention on matters of concern or by
engaging in legislative questions. All of these instruments are individually attributable MEP
10The UK was the last country to change from a majority voting to a proportional representation electoral
system in 1999. With respect to the national specificities, nine countries apply a closed-list proportional repre-
sentation electoral system. See Hix (2004) for further details. Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden have minimum vote requirements for
parties in place (Fondation Robert Schuman 2009, Nohlen 2004). The countries which have a party nomination
monopoly in place are the Czech Republic, Denmark, UK, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Nether-
lands and Slovakia (Lehmann 2009). In the remaining 17 countries, independent candidates can run for office.
Furthermore, rules of incompatibility prohibiting simultaneous dual office holding in the EP and at the national
or subnational level apply in nine countries (Lehmann 2009).
11See Lundell (2004) for further discussion.
12Since the Lisbon Treaty was put in place in 2010, legislative competencies of the European Parliament have
been further enlarged.
13See Benedetto (2005), Kaeding (2004, 2005), Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) and Hausemer (2006) for the
importance and allocation of rapporteurship in the European Parliament.
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rights.
Harmonization of base remuneration
The compensation package is principally composed of a monthly base remuneration and al-
lowances. Allowances include a per diem compensation for each plenary sitting day attended
(304 Euros in 2011).14 In addition, there are reimbursements for expenses associated with the
costs of running a MEP’s local office (4,299 Euros), travelling (the effective travelling costs are
reimbursed but not more than .5 Euros per kilometre distance), and staff (up to 19,700 Euros
monthly for effectively employed assistants). These allowances have always been paid by the
EU and are not affected by the base remuneration harmonization in 2009.
Prior to the 7th legislative period, the monthly base remuneration was fixed by the MEP’s home
country and equal to the base remuneration of the members of the national legislative assem-
bly. For example, the annual base remuneration paid to a Member of the European Parliament
from Hungary was 10,080 Euros. In contrast, his colleague from the Italian delegation was
paid 144,084 Euros. As of the beginning of the seventh legislative period, the new statute for
Members of the European Parliament, enacted by the European Council and the EP in summer
2005, was put in place. This new statute contains the harmonization of the base remuneration.
From July 2009 onwards, all MEPs receive a base remuneration equal to 38.5 percent of the
base remuneration of a judge of the European Court of Justice which is now paid out of the EU
budget. This is equivalent to 91, 983 Euro in July 2009.15 Table 1 displays the change in base
remuneration for all member countries. The Eastern European delegations, the Spanish, the
Portuguese, the Finnish and the Swedish delegations benefitted most from the harmonization,
while Italy and Austria had to accept a decrease in base remuneration. The harmonization led
to a base remuneration increase of, on average, 211%, and of 186% if corrected for changes in
GDP. Figure A.1 in the Appendix depicts the development of the base remuneration over the
5th, 6th and 7th legislative period. Table A.4 in the Appendix provides the respective figures and
percentage changes for the sample of old member countries. As can be seen, the remuneration
harmonization implied a significant increase and (in the countries which were members in the EU
before enlargement in 2004) a significantly larger increase than in the previous period.16 Overall,
14A MEP who attends all plenary sitting days in one year, earns around 18,000 Euros in per-diem allowances
in addition to the base remuneration.
15The new statute allowed incumbent MEPs to continue receiving the former, national base remuneration for
as long as the MEP stayed in parliamentary duty. We, however, do not have the information on who opted for
maintaining the old remuneration scheme and thus we have to neglect this issue in the empirical analysis. Accord-
ing to the parallel work by Fisman et al. (2012), there are only few MEPs who opted for the old remuneration
scheme.
16Obviously, there are exceptions. The Netherlands and Ireland experienced larger increases in the period
before. In our robustness checks, we therefore control the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of these
national delegations. Ideally, we would like to have information on the development of the remuneration in earlier
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for all national delegations after the reform and for a majority of national delegations before the
reform, the base remuneration constitutes the principal part of a MEP’s compensation.
4 Data
We, first, carefully document our data sources. Second, we briefly present our strategy to
categorize the ex-ante quality characteristics and describe them in turn.
4.1 Data sources
The information on the base remuneration in the sixth legislative period is mainly taken from
Corbett et al. (2003, 2005). For the 7th legislative period we use the information from the
European Parliament Information Bureau in Germany. As regards information on the individ-
ual MEPs, the primary source is the official MEP entry provided by the European Parliament
documentation service. Individual information contains year of birth, gender, date of entry into
the EP, party affiliation, current and former membership and position in committees and dele-
gations. More importantly, for many MEPs, a self-declared curriculum vitae is available ideally
including information about formal education, previous political experience as well as previous
occupational experience. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents one example of an individual MEP
entry. For MEPs who were elected to the 6th legislative period, though not re-elected to the 7th
legislative period, the collection of the background information proved to be challenging as the
curriculum vitae information is not available at the European Parliament. Therefore, we took
advantage of further sources providing information about the representatives such as the ”watch-
dog” organizations: Votewatch, Powerbase or La Quadrature du net.17 Moreover, we checked
the personal homepages of MEPs and party homepages in order to find or validate insufficient
or ambiguous information provided by the European Parliament. We used these further sources
when information was available in English, French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish. In
some cases, we took reference to Wikipedia which either offers additional individual information
for some MEPs or served to find further helpful sources. As regards in-office effort measures,
we took advantage of the information provided by the European Parliament and Votewatch.
Further sources and details are offered in the notes to Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
terms in order to better rule out a time trend in pay. However, such information is not available.
17Votewatch is an independent organization providing information and analysis of the voting behavior and
other activities of the MEPs. Powerbase is a wiki-database where profiles containing information on MEPs can
be found. La Quadrature du net is a transparency advocacy group. They have designed a toolbox in order to
follow and reach the MEPs.
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4.2 Background of politicians: categorization and descriptive statistics
We concentrate on three main ex-ante quality indicators: formal education, political experience
and occupation prior to election to the European Parliament.
Formal education
Formal education is a proxy for ability in the private sector and is arguably positively related
to ability in the political sector. Except for four percent of the MEPs, information on the
formal educational attainment is mostly well documented. We identify the highest formal degree
obtained. We classify the different levels of education into two main categories: Low to middle
level of formal education and high level of formal education. Low and middle level of formal
education include incomplete or intermediate school degree, apprenticeship or job training, high-
school diploma or still studying. High level of formal education includes all degrees obtained at
institutions of tertiary education; i.e., all completed Bachelor or Master degree at universities
or colleges of education, technical colleges, universities/higher schools of applied sciences as well
as postgraduate studies. We are further able to identify doctoral degree, medical doctor or
above (see Table 2). Out of all 1319 unique MEPs in the sixth and seventh legislative period,
87% indicate to have at least a degree from an institution of tertiary education.18 The fraction
of MEPs with a doctoral degree or above is 26%, which is compared to national parliaments
rather high (see Merlo et al. (2010) for the Italian parliament and Schindler (1999) for the
German parliament). When looking at the total of 54 delegations (27 countries times two
legislative periods), interesting differences emerge. The national delegation with the largest
share of MEPs with a Ph.D. degree is Latvia with 75% in the seventh legislative period (LP7),
whereas several national delegations, such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland (LP7), Estonia
(LP7) and Denmark (LP7) do not have any member with a Ph.D. degree. As regards low to
middle qualified MEPs, the share is highest in Austria in the 6th legislative period; i.e., 25%.
20 out of 54 delegations do not have any member without a tertiary education. In Table A.2 in
the Appendix, the summary statistics are shown and Table A.3 in the Appendix provides the
corresponding summary statistics at the delegation level.
Previous political experience
Our focus is on whether the MEP is elected prior to becoming a MEP to either a local, a regional
or a national executive office or legislative mandate. We assume that an elected position at a
higher level of government indicates higher and revealed quality (or at least more relevant
political experience). We capture the individual information on the position held at the highest
level of government. MEPs indicate the highest level of previous political experience to be local
18Among these 1319 unique MEPs, there are around 180 MEPs who retired early and a similar number of
MEPs who followed up.
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(14%), regional (12%) and national (39%). For 35% of the MEPs, no information is found. Most
likely, this indicates no previous political experience in an elected office rather than a lack of
information as politicians tend to report each previous political position held. Regarding the
composition of national delegations, again marked differences emerge. The delegations which
have no member with local political experience are Austria (LP6), Bulgaria (LP6), Cyprus,
Estonia (LP6), Latvia, Lithuania (LP6), Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia (LP7). The highest
fraction of MEPs with local experience is found for the French delegation in both legislative
periods; i.e., 31%. No members with regional experience are found in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland (LP7), Greece (LP7), Hungary, Ireland (LP7), Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. On the contrary, the Italian delegation has the
largest share of MEPs with regional experience; i.e., 27.4% (LP7). The national delegation
with the lowest share of MEPs with previous political experience at the national level is the
Netherlands in LP6; i.e., 6.25%. In contrast, all members of the national delegation of Latvia
in LP7 indicate to have previous political experience at the national level.
Previous occupation
We classified several occupational categories based on the last occupational position held by the
MEP before first election to the European Parliament. We are particularly interested in two
categories. The first category; i.e., occupations close to politics brings in the required knowledge
and understanding of the political process. It includes professional/(full-time) politicians, party
officials or assistants to politicians and trade union or trade association officials. If a person
has been more than 10 years previous to his election to the European Parliament holding an
elected political office, for example, being a member of the national parliament and indicated
no further outside-politics activity, we coded this MEP‘s previous occupational experience as
professional politician. The second category aims at capturing politicians with a previous high-
skill occupation or an occupation with high previous earning possibilities outside politics. The
category high-skill occupation includes white collar workers such as university professors, senior
public officials, liberal professions (e.g., lawyers, notaries, pharmacists, physicians and managers
in the private sector) and entrepreneurs and self-employed. See Table 2 for a detailed description
and the remaining categories. On average, 25.35% of all MEPs indicate to have a previous
occupation close to or in politics. The respective figure for the category high-skill profession is
37.1%. On the delegation level, the fraction of MEPs with a prior occupation close to politics
varies strongly. It is lowest in Lithuania in LP6; i.e., 7.14% and largest in Estonia in LP6; i.e.,
85.71%.
In Table A.2 in the Appendix, we display the summary statistics of the further employed
individual-level variables including gender, age, tenure, party affiliation, position in parliament
and the measures of in-office effort. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides further information
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about the variables at the delegation level.
5 Empirical analysis
We investigate three major issues. We start with the analysis of the relationship between the
remuneration reform and four measures of in-office effort. Subsequently, we focus our analysis
on the effect on political selection. Finally, we analyze the relationship between remuneration
and incumbency.
5.1 The remuneration harmonization and in-office effort
In order to investigate the effect of the pay harmonization on in-office effort, we apply the
following OLS model to our microdata:
Measure of effort i,d,t = β0+β1 ln(Base remunerationd,t)+β2LP7+β3Dd+β4Xd,t+β5Zi,d,t+i,d,t
where the dependent variable is the absence rate in percentage or the natural logarithm
of the number of plenary speeches, written declarations and drafted reports of individual i
adhering to the national delegation d in legislative period t (LP6 or LP7). We include the base
remuneration in natural logarithmic terms for the national delegation d at the beginning of
legislative period t. LP7 is an indicator variable of the post-harmonization legislative period.
The national delegation fixed effects are denoted by Dd. The vector Xd,t includes characteristics
common to the MEPs from a certain country; i.e., ln(GDP) and the corruption perceptions
index by Transparency International. The vector Zi,d,t captures individual characteristics such
as gender, age, tenure, party affiliation, educational, political and professional background and
chair position in committees and delegations. The error term is denoted .19
Given that the depending variables plenary speeches, written declarations and drafted reports
are logarithmized, we estimate specifications of a semilogarithmic functional form. Accordingly,
the coefficient for a continuous variable shows the percentage change in the untransformed
dependent variable per one-unit change in the explanatory factor. However, this interpretation
of the estimated correlation coefficients does not hold for categorical (dummy) variables.
Therefore, we also report estimated mean coefficients (in square brackets) that are consistent,
close to the unbiased results, and follow the interpretation of coefficients for continuous variables
(Kennedy 1981). As we are interested in the incentive effect of the remuneration reform, we
restrict our attention to the MEPs who are exposed to the exogenous change in the base
19As we look at two periods, our fixed effects estimation approach in levels is analytically the same as looking
at first differences.
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remuneration. We focus on the MEPs elected to both legislative periods and compare the effort
during the two first years of each legislative period; i.e., 2004-2006 and 2009-2011 (excluding all
MEPs who early retired or followed up during these time periods).20 The dummy variable for
the seventh legislative period is included to capture a common time trend; e.g, more contested
political issues that lead to more effort by politicians, in the absence of an institutional
change. National delegation fixed effects are included to account for unobserved country
specific time-invariant factors impacting in-office effort. Examples for such factors might be
time-invariant differences in national institutions, a national delegation-specific political culture
or simply the size of the delegation that influences the engagement in legislative activities. As
our variable of interest varies across national delegations, we calculate clustered standard errors
at this level to take into account intra-delegation correlation and correlation of the national
delegation over time.21
[Table 3 about here]
The first set of results is presented in Table 3 focusing on absence at plenary sitting days
(panels I and II) and engagement in plenary speeches (panels III and IV). In panel I, we find
that the coefficient for the base remuneration is positive and statistically significant at the 10%
level, which implies that an increased base remuneration is related to a higher absence rate. In
each specification, we include ln(GDP) and the Corruption Perceptions Index to approximate
major socio-economic country characteristics. The two variables, however, are not statistically
significantly related to absence. In panel II, we introduce individual MEP characteristics that
are potentially correlated with in-office effort. We take gender, age, tenure, party affiliation,
educational, political and occupational background as well as committee and delegation chair
position into account. Except for a negative coefficient for MEPs who chair a committee, i.e.,
being less absent, no clear picture emerges. The estimated coefficient for the remuneration
remains almost unchanged. This result seems surprising as it stands in contrast to the hypothesis
20See the second part of Table A.2 in the Appendix for summary statistics of this subsample.
21We are aware that with the small number of clusters, the standard error adjustment for clustering runs the
danger of underestimating intra-delegation correlation and/or serial correlation. In order to assess our results
as regards intra-group correlation, we also ran our regressions with delegation averages (without individual level
variables) instead of microlevel data; e.g., with the average legislative engagement per delegation or with the
fraction of MEPs with a university degree as dependent variable. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar.
We prefer the estimation approach on the microlevel. First, we can include a rich set of further relevant individual
controls. Second, on the aggregate level, the small number of delegations immediately raises questions of whether
or not to compute robust standard errors (relying on large sample size properties as well) in order to take
heteroskedasticity in the delegation residuals into account. And, whether or not to weight the average delegation
observations due to differences in delegation size. As regards serial correlation, Hansen (2007) shows that standard
errors adjusted for clustering are reliable even if the number of clusters is small (see Angrist and Pischke 2009,
chapter eight for a discussion).
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that a higher pay has a disciplining effect on politicians. However, it lends support for the
evidence provided by Mocan and Altindag (2011) who argue that the base remuneration reform
constitutes an increase in unearned income. Accordingly, better remunerated MEPs face weaker
incentives to collect per-diem compensation as this second part of the compensation package has
become a relatively less important source of income. If this relationship also holds for more direct
measures of legislative effort is not addressed by Mocan and Altindag (2011).22 We therefore
propose to look at three further measures of in-office effort to offer a broad basis for evaluating
the impact of monetary incentives on discipline.
In the second part of Table 3, we look at engagement in plenary speeches.23 We find that a higher
base remuneration is related to more engagement in plenary speeches. The estimated coefficient
for the remuneration can be interpreted as an elasticity of 0.18 since we look at logarithms.
A 10% increase in the remuneration is related to 1.78% more plenary speeches ceteris paribus.
This result holds not only if we adjust for country controls in panel III but also if we adjust
for our full set of covariates in panel IV. In addition, we find that the engagement in plenary
speeches has increased from the 6th to the 7th legislative period.
[Table 4 about here]
In Table 4, we analyze the effect of the reform on two further legislative in-office measures;
i.e., the engagement in written declarations and drafted reports. In panel I, we report a strong
positive correlation between the remuneration and the engagement in writing declarations. This
result holds if we include individual controls in panel II. A similar result - though measured with
less precision - is found for engagement in drafting reports in panels III and IV. With regard to
the size of the coefficient, we find that, for example, a 10% increase in the base remuneration
is associated, on average, with a 1.1% increase in the number of drafted reports ceteris paribus
(panel IV). Both results are consistent with the hypothesis that an increased remuneration
induces more discipline and leads to more in-office effort of elected politicians. As regards the
further explanatory variables, we find that MEPs with a party affiliation, as compared to non-
attached MEPs, engage less in writing declarations and more in drafting reports. This result
is intuitive as non-attached members are less likely to be rapporteurs and, therefore, choose
other means to influence legislative activities. Chairing a committee significantly increases the
engagement in both legislative activities. Committee chairmanship is statistically significantly
associated with 32.96% more submitted written declarations (at the 5% significance level) and
22Fisman et al. (2012) further focus on shirking and look at the difference between signing the register at the
entry and participating in voting sessions. They find that this form of shirking is not affected by the change in
base remuneration and is positively correlated to home-country corruption. This relationship is identified based
on mainly cross-country variation in corruption.
23See Slapin and Proksch (2010) for an analysis of parliamentary speeches.
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with 175.2% more submitted drafted reports (at the 10% significance level).24
Our results suggest that the remuneration matters for in-office effort, however, no clear picture
emerges. An increase in remuneration appears to reduce attendance. A possible explanation is
the weaker incentive to collect per-diem allowances. At the same time, we find more engagement
in legislative activities which is consistent with the hypothesis that a higher pay constitutes a
disciplining device. The individual ex-ante quality characteristics do not appear to matter in
a systematic way for engagement in the analyzed in-office effort measures. The results suggest
that one should be careful relying only on one approximation measure of effort to evaluate the
effects of pay on discipline in politics.
5.2 The remuneration harmonization and political selection
In this section, we test whether the remuneration reform affects the composition of the pool of
the MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality characteristics. According to large parts of the theoretical
literature and the previous empirical contributions, we expect that a higher pay attracts better
qualified politicians. We, first, look at the compositional effects in the legislative period before
and after the base remuneration harmonization. Second, we focus on the sample of elected
freshmen.
We estimate the following linear probability model (OLS):25
Quality of MEP i,d,t = β0+β1 ln(Base remunerationd,t)+β2LP7+β3Dd+β4Xd,t+β5Zi,d,t+i,d,t
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual MEP
i adhering to the national delegation d in legislative period t exhibits a certain (ex-ante) qual-
ity characteristic. The further denotation is similar to the one described before. The post-
harmonization dummy variable LP7 controls for a time trend in the quality characteristics of
the politicians. The national delegation fixed effects are included to account for unobserved
national delegation specific time-invariant factors affecting the quality of politicians. One might
think of time-invariant differences between countries in the educational system impacting the ed-
ucational structure, the rules that govern the labor market affecting the occupational structure
or differences in the political institutions governing the electoral system or the federal structure
24If we estimate the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 without transforming the dependent variable into logarithmic
terms, we find qualitatively similar results.
25We are aware of the challenges that come with the linear probability model as regards heteroskedasticity,
distribution of errors and linearity. Therefore, we did also run the regressions with a logistic regression model.
Applying a logit model causes a loss in observations due to sparseness and the interpretation of the estimated
coefficients is less straight forward. As results are qualitatively similar and provide coefficients of similar size
when computing either marginal effects at the mean or average marginal effects, we prefer the linear probability
model. The additional results are available upon request
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of a country. In addition to adjusting for income and corruption at the country level, we control
for individual characteristics to account for the possibility that MEPs of different gender, age,
and ideology have a systematically different educational, political and occupational background.
For example, descriptive evidence on national politics suggests that conservative politicians are
better educated and come from high-skill professions (e.g., lawyers or entrepreneurs in politics).
[Table 5 about here]
All MEPs
In Table 5, we present the estimation results for the sample of MEPs who were elected to the
parliament and neither retired early nor followed up.26 In panel I, we take the probability
that the individual MEP has a university degree as our measure of (ex-ante) quality. As the
fraction of MEPs with at least a tertiary degree is about 87%, we concentrate in panel II on the
probability that an MEP has at least a doctoral degree as a more selective indication. We find
no statistically significant evidence that a higher remuneration leads to a selection of formally
better educated politicians neither if we look at the fraction of MEPs with at least a university
degree nor if we look at the fraction of MEPs with a very high level of tertiary education. This
result contrasts with the evidence found by Fisman et al. (2012). They also apply a linear
probability model and report a negative selection effect on the formal education of politicians as
approximated with the fraction of MEPs with a degree from the top 500 universities across the
world provided by the 2010 Academic Ranking of World Universities. In panels III and IV, we
concentrate on previous elected political experience. We find no effect of the remuneration on
the probability that a MEP has at least local previous political experience in panel III. While we
find - in contrast to our expectation - a negative coefficient for the partial correlation between the
remuneration and the probability that a MEP has an elected office at the highest national level
prior to election, this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. We find
no indication that a higher remuneration attracts more politicians with a previous occupation
close to politics (panel V) or with a previous high-skill occupation (panel VI).
The results so far suggest that while the remuneration reform impacts in-office effort, it has no
(short-run) effect on the composition of politicians in terms of the three proposed observable
ex-ante quality characteristics. In particular, we find no evidence for the argument that a
higher remuneration attracts better qualified candidates. In the next step, we want to better
understand the latter finding and investigate whether the results on the composition of the pool
of politicians also hold for the selection of freshmen.
26The results do not change if we include MEPs who retired early and who followed up. However, we want to
avoid including follow-ups and retirements that may be dominated by party strategic considerations or election
(not election) to national offices.
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Freshmen
The analysis of freshmen, all being successful candidates, is closer to the question of whether
higher pay influences electoral competition by impacting the incentives to enter politics and
whether this leads to a different (improved) selection of politicians.
[Table 6 about here]
In Table 6, we run the same regressions as in the previous analysis and restrict our attention
to the sample of freshmen elected to the 6th and 7th legislative period and exclude MEPs who
followed-up. As we can see in panels I and II, again, a higher base remuneration does not
statistically significantly impact the educational level of the newly elected MEPs. With respect
to political experience, the effect of a higher remuneration on the fraction of newly elected
MEPs with previous elected political experience at the highest national level is - rather than
positive as expected - negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. As regards the
size of the coefficient, doubling the base remuneration is statistically significantly related to a
9.6 percentage points (=ln(2) x β1) decrease in the probability that a MEP has prior political
experience at the national level. Institutional reasons for this negative effect might be grounded
in either the timing of national elections or the federal structure of the member countries. The
(potentially) higher attractiveness of national parliamentary seats in terms of reputation and
decision-making power for politicians might distract candidates with experience at the national
level from running for a EP seat in years of parallel national elections. Another argument
alludes to the different federal structures of the member countries. Our result might be driven
by countries where national politicians face relatively more competitors from the subnational
level which is the more the case in federally organized countries. We tested both arguments and
find no evidence that our result is driven by the more federal member countries or by the member
countries in which parallel national elections take place. When looking at the composition of
the freshmen MEPs in terms of previous occupation, again, no statistically significant partial
correlations for the remuneration are found.27
5.3 The remuneration harmonization and re-election
In this section, we want to address the question whether an increase in the remuneration of
politicians increases incumbency. On theoretical grounds, there are two opposing arguments:
On the one hand, a higher remuneration increases the attractiveness of becoming a politician
27We also addressed the heterogeneity within the group of high-skill professions. As incentives to enter politics
may differ between high-skill professions from the public sector (university professors and senior civil servants)
and the private sector, we split up these subgroups and looked at them separately. We find no different patterns.
The additional estimation results are available upon request.
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which leads to fierce electoral competition for political office and decreased re-election chances.
On the other hand, an upcoming increase in pay reinforces the re-electoral incentives of the
incumbents as the value of future office holding increases which enhances re-election rates.
In Figure 1, we plot the change in the base remuneration against the change in the fraction of
re-elected MEPs in the countries that were members before enlargement in 2004. The figure on
the first differences suggests that there is a positive relationship between the remuneration and
re-election.
[Figure 1 about here]
In Table 7, we consider again a linear probability model. We concentrate on the sample of
MEPs who were elected to the 6th and 7th legislative period (excluding all follow-up MEPs)
from the 15 member countries before enlargement in 2004. In panel I, adjusting for country-level
covariates, we find that a higher remuneration increases the re-election rate. This finding is also
robust to the inclusion of individual controls in panel II. We also find that the prior political
experience and the previous occupational background are positively related to the probability
of being re-elected. Doubling the MEP base remuneration is statistically significantly related
to an increased re-election probability of 17.7 percentage points (=ln(2) x β1). It lends support
for the argument that incumbents who face an increased value of future office holding can take
advantage of their incumbent position in the electoral competition when pleasing the party
leader and/or when competing for votes.
[Table 7 about here]
In further robustness checks (not shown), we investigated whether our results throughout the pa-
per are sensitive to the exclusion of particular national delegations. First, we ran the regressions
without the delegations that entered later; i.e., Bulgaria and Romania. Second, we excluded
the Dutch and the Irish delegations that experienced larger increases in the base remuneration
due to national reforms in the legislative period before the harmonization took place. For both
exercises, we find very similar results. Third, we excluded Italy and Austria that experienced
a decrease in the base remuneration and the respective incumbent MEPs have a stronger in-
centive to opt out of the new remuneration rule. Without Italy and Austria, we estimate a
weaker positive partial correlation between the base remuneration and absence and a stronger
positive partial correlation between the base remuneration and engagement in plenary debates.
As regards political selection, the negative coefficient for the impact of the remuneration reform
on the fraction of MEPs with national experience gets larger. The estimated coefficient for the
effect of the remuneration reform on re-election is also larger.
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6 Concluding remarks
Political economics emphasizes the importance of institutional conditions as disciplining and
selection devices. In this paper, we investigate the two complementary perspectives focusing on
the remuneration of politicians.
Based on a thoroughly collected and detailed new data set on the Members of the European
Parliament between 2004 and 2011, we exploit the fundamental base remuneration reform in
2009 and study the impact on discipline and on selection into parliament. Apart from strongly
varying patterns in the composition of national delegations in terms of ex-ante quality charac-
teristics, we find that the remuneration reform impacts discipline and selection in different ways.
We apply a fixed effects model controlling for time-invariant and country-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity to the rich micro-data set. A positive incentive effect on engagement in speeches,
written declarations and drafted reports is found. However, a higher base remuneration is re-
lated to more absence. With respect to political selection, we find that a higher remuneration
increases the incumbency rate. The composition of the MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality is,
however, unaffected by the exceptional remuneration reform. If we restrict our attention to
freshmen, we find that a higher base remuneration is related to a lower fraction of MEPs with
previous experience at the highest national level, indicating a decrease in the ex-ante quality of
entering politicians. Overall, our results support the view that the remuneration rule matters
for disciplining political agents. In contrast to recent empirical work on local or national politi-
cians, no support is found for the role of higher remuneration in systematically improving the
(ex-ante) quality of politicians.
Especially the latter result calls for further discussion. We provide evidence for a pattern that
works against strong changes in the composition of the pool of MEPs; i.e., the re-election of
incumbents. Political competition forces seem to favor incumbent MEPs. A lower turnover,
though, does not explain why we do not find a selection of MEPs with better ex-ante quality
characteristics when focusing on freshmen. In trying to better understand this result, particular
attention has to be paid to the proportional electoral rule and the correspondingly strong role
of national parties in nominating candidates for the European elections. These institutional
conditions weaken self-selection forces emphasized in current political economics research. If
national parties control the entry to the European Parliament and allocate seats either to inex-
perienced politicians with national-level political career ambitions as a sort of training arena or
to politicians who are about to retire, changes in the remuneration are likely to be of secondary
importance. Then, the European Parliament is rather a laboratory to study the effects of elec-
toral rules and parties in selecting and allocating candidates to different levels of government. A
last argument concerns the timing of our analysis. As career paths into the European Parliament
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are anecdotally reported to be quite stable (see e.g., Scarrow 1997) and the overall supply of
politicians is likely to be rather fixed in the short run, we only identify weak short-run selection
effects in the present study while selection patterns may change with substantial delay. Initial
changes may occur at the candidate level; e.g., the number and quality of candidates running
for a MEP seat. This is, however, left to future research.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Change in base remuneration versus change in re-election rate
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the percentage points change in the re-election rate from the
6th to the 7th legislative period. We include only MEPs who were elected at the beginning of
each legislative period (excluding follow-up MEPs). The horizontal axis shows the change in
base remuneration due to the reform. Delta Ln(remuneration) is defined as the logarithm of the
harmonized base remuneration as of the beginning of the 7th legislative period; i.e., 91,983 Euros
minus the logarithm of the base remuneration as of the beginning of the 6th legislative period
for MEPs from the 15 (old) member countries. Country labels: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL),
Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRK), Germany (GER), Greece (GRE), Ireland (IRL),
Italy (ITA), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NED), Portugal (POR), Spain (ESP), Sweden
(SWE), and United Kingdom (UK).
Sources: See Table A.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Annual base remuneration before and after the reform in 2009 in Euros
Before After Change Change in
Country reform reform in % % corrected
(in 2004) (in 2009) for GDP/capita
Hungary 10,080 91,983 813% 798%
Bulgaria 10,226 91,983 800% 675%
Latvia 12,518 91,983 635% 567%
Slovakia 14,085 91,983 553% 416%
Lithuania 14,197 91,983 548% 467%
Malta 15,534 91,983 492% 442%
Czech Republic 19,774 91,983 365% 306%
Romania 21,746 91,983 323% 294%
Estonia 21,864 91,983 321% 295%
Poland 28,860 91,983 219% 154%
Spain 38,396 91,983 140% 137%
Portugal 48,286 91,983 90% 89%
Slovenia 48,815 91,983 88% 70%
Cyprus 52,041 91,983 77% 65%
Finland 59,640 91,983 54% 50%
Sweden 62,069 91,983 48% 47%
Luxembourg 63,791 91,983 44% 36%
Denmark 69,816 91,983 32% 34%
Belgium 72,018 91,983 28% 25%
Greece 73,850 91,983 25% 15%
France 81,273 91,983 13% 12%
United Kingdom 83,312 91,983 10% 11%
Ireland 83,712 91,983 10% 15%
Germany 84,108 91,983 9% 6%
Netherlands 86,126 91,983 7% 1%
Austria 106,583 91,983 –14% –18%
Italy 144,084 91,983 –36% –32%
Average 52,845 91,983 211% 184%
Notes: The values show the annual base remuneration at the beginning of the 6th and the 7th
legislative period in Euro. For Bulgaria and Romania, which entered the European parliament
in 2007, the values report the base remuneration paid before the reform as the average of the
years 2007 - 2009. The adjustment for the percentage change in GDP per capita is based on
data from the World Development Indicators.
Sources: See Table A.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Classification of formal education, previous political experience and previous
occupation
Classification Details
Formal education
No information No indication about any obtained school degree is
found.
Low to middle level of formal education Incomplete school degree, intermediate school degree,
apprenticeship or job training, high school degree or
still studying.
High level of formal education
– University degree Completed Bachelor or Master degree at universities
or at colleges of education, technical colleges, higher
schools of applied sciences as well as postgraduate
studies.
– Doctoral degree or above Completed Ph.D. or M.D. (medical doctor); com-
pleted Ph.D. and further qualifications such as univer-
sity lecturer or diplomatic college; assistant professor
or full professor.
Previous political experience
No information MEP does not indicate any previous elected political
position.
Local political experience Member of the local legislative assembly/local council
and elected executive positions such as mayor.
Regional political experience Member of the regional parliament and executive po-
sitions such as president/head of government of the
region or regional minister.
National political experience Member of the national parliament or senate as well
executive positions such as president, prime minister,
chancellor, and national minister.
Previous occupation
No information MEP does not indicate any previous occupation held.
Occupational background close to politics
– Professional/(Full-time) politicians MEP indicates a position such as head of government,
minister or member of parliament or senate during
the last 10 years before elected to the European Par-
liament and no other simultaneous employment.
– continued on next page –
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Table 2 – continued
Classification Detail
– Party officials or political assistants Fulltime (leading) party official, employee of a party
or of a politician.
– Trade union or trade association officials Employee of a trade union or a trade association.
High-skill occupations
– Professors MEP indicates to be an assistant or full professor at
an institution of tertiary education.
– Senior public officials Senior public servants; i.e., for example, leading posi-
tion in various fields of public administration, judge,
ambassador or diplomat.
– Senior managers Senior employee position in the private sector.
– Liberal professions Legal professions such as lawyer and notary as well as
pharmacist, physician, architect and accountant.
– Self-employed and entrepreneurs MEP indicates to be self-employed or to run his own
business.
Other occupations
– Low/middle level public servants Public servant or public sector employee who indicates
teacher, public servant or employee in public admin-
istration, employee of the judicial branch, member of
the military and police official (senior official positions
excluded).
– Media-related professions Editor, journalist, publisher and author.
– Agricultural sector Farmer and employee in the agricultural sector.
– Employees in the private sector Employee in the private sector (senior managers ex-
cluded).
– Engineers MEP indicates to work as engineer.
– Further indicated occupations (main ac-
tivities)
Athlete, singer, pastor, political activist.
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Table 3: The effects of remuneration on in-office effort
Absence and engagement in plenary speeches
I II III IV
Dependent variable: Absence rate Plenary speeches
ln(Remuneration) 1.409* 1.375* 0.178** 0.174*
(0.81) (0.75) (0.08) (0.08)
LP7 –0.637 –0.385 0.452*** 0.342**
(1.41) (1.40) (0.15) (0.15)
[0.553] [.391]
ln(GDP) 7.051 4.405 –0.606 –0.613
(13.99) (13.52) (1.54) (1.63)
Corruption –1.714 –1.456 0.205 0.212
(1.78) (1.62) (0.13) (0.15)
Woman –0.003 0.110
(0.82) (0.09)
[0.112]
Age –0.084 –0.017***
(0.06) (0.01)
Tenure –0.048 0.188***
(0.47) (0.03)
EPP –4.841 –0.343
(3.96) (0.26)
[-0.314]
S&D –4.741 –0.353
(3.58) (0.30)
[-0.327]
ALDE –4.173 0.002
(3.79) (0.30)
[-0.042]
EFA –5.897* –0.014
(3.44) (0.32)
[-0.062]
GUE/NGL –0.029 0.075
(4.82) (0.32)
[0.024]
Other party 0.569 –0.173
(2.66) (0.33)
[-0.203]
University degree –0.441 –0.203
(1.26) (0.22)
[-0.204]
At least local political experience 1.204 0.039
(1.02) (0.09)
[0.036]
– continued on next page –
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Table 3 – continued
I II III IV
Dependent variable: Absence rate Plenary speeches
Occupation close to politics 4.087 –0.007
(4.26) (0.20)
[-0.028]
High-skill occupation 2.798 0.174
(4.64) (0.19)
[0.170]
Other occupation 2.758 –0.014
(4.58) (0.21)
[-0.035]
Committee chair –3.203*** 0.313**
(0.94) (0.13)
[0.356]
Delegation chair 0.629 0.004
(1.99) (0.13)
[-0.004]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 606 606 604 604
No. of clusters 25 25 25 25
R2 .081 .136 .221 .282
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country (national delegation) level in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1,**
.01 < p < .05, *** p < .01. The sample includes all individual MEPs elected to the 6th and
re-elected to the 7th legislative period who were MEPs for the whole two first years in both
legislative periods (N=303). Excluded are MEPs who retired earlier or followed-up and the
MEPs from Bulgaria and Romania who joined in 2007. Dependent variable in I and II: Absence
rate in percentage, in panel III and IV: Ln(number of speeches) where we apply a ln(number
of speeches + 1) transformation in order to make use of the MEPs who did not engage in
plenary speeches. LP7 stands for seventh legislative period. As regards ideology, EPP stands
for European People’s Party, S&D for Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, ALDE
for Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, EFA for Green/European Free Alliance, and
GUE/NGL for European United Left-Nordic Green Left. Other party captures Europe of Free-
dom and Democracy (EFD), European Conservatives and Reformist (ECR), Union for Europe
of the Nations (UEN) or Independence/Democracy Group (Ind/Dem). The reference category
is non-attached members. Occupation close to politics includes: Party official, trade union or
trade association official, professional politician. High-skill profession includes: (university)
professor, senior public official, senior manager, liberal professions and entrepreneurs. The
reference category for occupational background is no occupation indicated. The values in square
brackets accommodate the fact that we use a semilogarithmic functional form with dummy vari-
ables. The coefficients of the percentage change for all dummy variables are computed using the
post estimation Stata command “logdummy”. Sources: See Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: The effect of remuneration on in-office effort
Engagement in writing declarations and drafting reports
I II III IV
Dependent variable: Written declarations Drafted reports
ln(Remuneration) 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.103 0.110*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
LP7 0.098 0.128* –0.068 –0.131***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
[0.101] [0.134] [-0.067] [-0.123]
ln(GDP) –1.593** –1.457** 1.000 1.222*
(0.71) (0.67) (0.67) (0.66)
Corruption 0.128 0.109* –0.036 –0.040
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Woman –0.066 0.067
(0.06) (0.05)
[-0.065] [.007]
Age –0.001 –0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Tenure –0.014 0.062***
(0.03) (0.02)
EPP –0.530** 0.492***
(0.21) (0.13)
[-0.425] [0.622]
S&D –0.414* 0.405***
(0.21) (0.09)
[-0.354] [0.492]
ALDE –0.292 0.415***
(0.24) (0.14)
[-0.274] [0.500]
EFA –0.130 0.466***
(0.23) (0.12)
[-0.144] [0.582]
GUE/NGL –0.387* 0.349**
(0.20) (0.16)
[-0.335] [0.399]
Other party –0.672*** 0.335*
(0.21) (0.17)
[-0.501] [0.379]
University degree 0.051 –0.004
(0.05) (0.07)
[0.051] [-0.067]
At least local political experience –0.015 –0.040
(0.05) (0.06)
[-0.016] [-0.042]
– continued on next page –
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Table 4 – continued
I II III IV
Dependent variable: Written declarations Drafted report
Occupation close to politics 0.149 –0.017
(0.17) (0.13)
[0.144] [-0.026]
High-skill occupation 0.215 0.035
(0.18) (0.15)
[0.219] [0.024]
Other occupation 0.215 0.065
(0.16) (0.12)
[0.223] [0.059]
Committee chair 0.297* 1.019***
(0.16) (0.12)
[0.330] [1.752]
Delegation chair –0.064 –0.008
(0.09) (0.15)
[-0.066] [-0.192]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 606 606 606 606
No. of clusters 25 25 25 25
R2 .098 .179 .069 .188
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country (national delegation) MEP level in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1,**
.01 < p < .05, *** p < .01. The sample includes all individual MEPs elected to the 6th and
re-elected to the 7th legislative period who were MEPs for the whole two first years in both
legislative periods (N=303). Excluded are MEPs who retired earlier or followed-up and the
MEPs from Bulgaria and Romania who joined in 2007. Dependent variable in panel I and II:
Ln(number of written declarations) and in panel III and IV: Ln(number of drafted reports).
In all panels, we apply a ln(n + 1) transformation in order to make use of the MEPs who did
not submit written declarations or reports. The values in square brackets accommodate the
fact that we use a semilogarithmic functional form with dummy variables. The coefficients of
the percentage change for all dummy variables are computed using the post estimation Stata
command “logdummy”. For further details, see Table 3.
Sources: See Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 7: The effect of remuneration on re-election
Dependent variable: Re-election dummy
I II
ln(Remuneration) 0.371*** 0.263***
(0.08) (0.07)
LP7 –0.034 –0.026
(0.05) (0.02)
ln(GDP) –1.582* –0.864
(0.79) (0.51)
Corruption 0.129 0.119**
(0.09) (0.05)
Woman 0.023
(0.02)
Age –0.000
(0.00)
Tenure 0.300***
(0.02)
EPP 0.102
(0.06)
S&D 0.080
(0.06)
ALDE 0.049
(0.06)
EFA 0.066
(0.05)
GUE/NGL 0.100*
(0.06)
Other party 0.061
(0.06)
University degree 0.005
(0.03)
At least local political experience 0.033
(0.02)
High-skill and close to politics occupation 0.039*
(0.02)
Country fixed effects yes yes
No. of observation 991 990
No. of clusters 15 15
R2 .092 .570
Notes: Partial correlations form OLS (Linear Probability Model). Robust standard errors
clustered at the country (national delegation) level. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, **
.01 < p < .05, *** < .01. Observations from the 15 (old) member countries are included.
Sources: See Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament in the 5th, 6th
and 7th legislative period
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Notes: LP stands for legislative period. The lines connect the values for each legislative period.
The lines do not imply a continuous increase within the legislative periods. Regular legislative
periods in the European Parliament last five years. The 5th (6th) legislative period lasted from
1999 to 2004 (2004-2009).
Sources: The values for the 5th legislative period are taken from Corbett et al. (2003) who report
the base remuneration as of autumn 2001. The values for the 6th legislative period are taken
from Corbett et al. (2005) reporting the values as of the beginning of the 6th legislative period
in late 2004. The value for the 7th legislative period is taken from the European Parliament
Information Bureau in Germany (www.europarl.de) and indicates the value as of the beginning
of the 7th legislative period. For further details see Table A.3.
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Table A.1: Example of an entry for a Spanish Member of the European Parliament
Sources: www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/4337/Alejandro CERCAS.html, visited on
13.08.2012.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics I
Individual information
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
MEP characteristics
Female 1319 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age 1319 49.45 10.61 21 90
Tenure 1319 1.46 0.91 1 6
Ideology
European People’s Party (EPP) 1319 0.35 0.48 0 1
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 1319 0.28 0.45 0 1
Democrats (S&D)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 1319 0.13 0.33 0 1
for Europe (ALDE)
Green/European Free Alliance (EFA) 1319 0.06 0.24 0 1
European United Left-Nordic Green 1319 0.05 0.22 0 1
Left (GUE/NGL)
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 1319 0.02 0.13 0 1
European Conservatives and Reformist (ECR) 1319 0.02 0.13 0 1
Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) 1319 0.03 0.18 0 1
Independence/Democracy Group (Ind/Dem) 1319 0.02 0.14 0 1
Non-attached members 1319 0.04 0.20 0 1
Education, political and occupational experience
No educational information 1319 0.04 0.19 0 1
Low to middle level of education 1319 0.10 0.29 0 1
University degree (without Ph.D.) 1319 0.61 0.49 0 1
Doctoral degree and above 1319 0.26 0.44 0 1
No political experience information 1319 0.35 0.48 0 1
Local political experience 1319 0.14 0.35 0 1
Regional political experience 1319 0.12 0.33 0 1
National political experience 1319 0.39 0.49 0 1
No occupational experience 1319 0.04 0.18 0 1
Occupations close to politics 1319 0.25 0.43 0 1
High-skill occupations 1319 0.37 0.48 0 1
Other occupations 1319 0.34 0.47 0 1
Position in parliament
Committee chair 1319 0.02 0.15 0 1
Delegation chair 1319 0.04 0.20 0 1
– continued on next page –
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Table A.2 – continued
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Subsample of MEPs elected to the 6th and 7th LP
MEP characteristics
Female 303 0.33 0.47 0 1
Age 303 49.49 9.14 28 76
Tenure 303 1.76 1.05 1 6
Ideology
European People’s Party (EPP) 303 0.46 0.50 0 1
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 303 0.25 0.43 0 1
Democrats (S&D)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 303 0.11 0.31 0 1
Green/European Free Alliance (EFA) 303 0.06 0.24 0 1
European United Left-Nordic Green 303 0.04 0.20 0 1
Left (GUE/NGL)
Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)** 303 0.02 0.14 0 1
Independence/Democracy Group (Ind/Dem)** 303 0.02 0.15 0 1
Non-attached members 303 0.04 0.19 0 1
Education, political and professional experience
No educational information 303 0.02 0.13 0 1
Low to middle level of education 303 0.11 0.31 0 1
University degree (without Ph.D.) 303 0.63 0.48 0 1
Doctoral degree and above 303 0.25 0.43 0 1
No political experience information 303 0.34 0.48 0 1
Local political experience 303 0.15 0.36 0 1
Regional political experience 303 0.12 0.32 0 1
National political experience 303 0.39 0.49 0 1
No occupational experience 303 0.01 0.10 0 1
Occupation close to politics 303 0.29 0.45 0 1
High-skill occupations 303 0.36 0.48 0 1
Other occupations 303 0.34 0.48 0 1
Position in parliament
Committee chair 303 0.03 0.17 0 1
Delegation chair 303 0.02 0.14 0 1
– continued on next page –
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Table A.2 – continued
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Measures of in-office effort
Absence rate 606 10.71 8.66 0 47.41
Number of plenary speeches 604 43.22 64.16 0 649
Number of written declarations 606 .70 1.28 0 11
Number of drafted reports 606 1.20 2.44 0 28
Notes: There are 1319 unique MEPs who served between 2004 and 2011. If the parliamentarian is
member of both legislative assemblies, the descriptive statistics are indicated for the first period.
The subsample of MEPs elected to the 6th and 7th legislative period concentrates on MEPs who
were members in the two first years of each legislative period. In the subsample, MEPs who
retired early or followed up as well as the MEPs from Bulgaria and Romania who joined in
2007 are excluded. Tenure is indicated as the number of previous membership in legislative
periods. In the current legislative period, there are seven political parties: European People’s
Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the Greens-European Free Alliance (EFA), European United
Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and European
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). EFD and ECR are new political groups formed at the
beginning of the seventh legislative period. ECR is a split off of the EPP. It is composed of
MEPs who were previously members of the EPP, Union for Europe of the Nation (UEN) and
Independence/Democracy Group (Ind/Dem). As the Independence/Democracy and Union for
Europe suffered heavy losses in the 2009 election, they had on their own no longer enough
members to form a separate political group. Therefore, MEPs from these parties formed EFD
on 1 July 2009. In the subsample of 303 MEPs, the party affiliation is categorized as of the
beginning of the sixth legislative period. The values for the measures of in-office effort summarize
the sixth and the seventh legislative period for each MEP in the subsample. The delegation level
descriptive statistics are shown in Table A.3.
Sources: Official MEP entries at the European Parliament. For complementary information on
the educational, political and professional background, further sources are votewatch, powerbase,
la quadrature du net, offical national party homepages and the personal MEP homepages.
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics II
Information on delegation level
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Composition regarding formal education
No information 54 2.81 4.72 0 20
Low to middle level of formal education 54 6.79 7.54 0 25
University degree (without Ph.D.) 54 63.76 17.82 25 100
Doctoral degree or above 54 26.64 18.73 0 75
Composition regarding political experience
No information 54 33.79 18.65 0 83.33
Local political experience 54 8.84 8.37 0 31.17
Regional political experience 54 6.20 8.06 0 27.40
National political experience 54 51.18 24.03 6.25 100
Composition regarding occupation
No information 54 3.12 4.39 0 17.24
Occupations close to politics 54 31.03 15.54 7.14 85.71
High-skill occupations 54 33.39 15.37 0 71.43
Other occupations 54 32.45 9.98 0 66.67
Further variables
Fraction of women 54 32.69 12.46 0 60
Fraction of incumbents 30 46.21 15.12 12.90 77.11
Ln(Remuneration) 54 11.02 .69 9.22 11.88
ln(GDP) 54 9.53 0.83 7.70 10.96
Corruption index 54 6.36 1.91 2.9 9.7
Notes: The unit of observation is the national delegation in the 6th and 7th legislative period.
Ln(Renumeration) is defined as the logarithm of the base remuneration at the beginning of the
6th or 7thlegislative period. The base remuneration in the 7thlegislative period is a constant and
the amount is 91,983 Euros. The values for the 6th legislative period are taken from Corbett et
al. (2005) reporting the values at the beginning of the 6th legislative period. For Bulgaria and
Romania, which joined the European Parliament in 2007, the values are complemented with
information from Mocan and Altindag (2011). They report the base remuneration paid just
before the reform as the average of the years 2007 - 2009. The value for the 7th legislative period
is taken from the European Parliament Information Bureau in Germany (www.europarl.de) and
indicates the value at the beginning of the 7th legislative period. The fraction of incumbents
refers to the 15 old member countries before enlargement in 2004. Ln(GDP) is the logarithm of
the GDP per capita in each country in the year of election taken from the World Development
Indicators. The corruption index measures the perceived corruption in each country in the year
of election and is taken from Transparency International. It is scaled from 0 to 10, 10 indicates
the lowest level of perceived corruption.
43
T
a
b
le
A
.4
:
A
n
n
u
a
l
b
as
e
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n
in
th
e
5
th
,
6
th
an
d
7
th
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e
p
er
io
d
in
E
u
ro
s.
C
o
u
n
tr
y
B
as
e
re
m
u
n
er
a
ti
o
n
B
as
e
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n
B
as
e
re
m
u
n
er
at
io
n
C
h
an
ge
in
%
fr
om
C
h
an
ge
in
%
fr
om
in
L
P
5
in
L
P
6
in
L
P
7
L
P
5
to
L
P
6
L
P
6
to
L
P
7
S
p
a
in
3
4,
19
0
38
,3
96
91
,9
83
12
%
14
0%
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
44
,2
0
3
48
,2
86
91
,9
83
9%
90
%
F
in
la
n
d
54
,4
9
3
59
,6
40
91
,9
83
9%
54
%
S
w
ed
en
48
,8
2
9
62
,0
69
91
,9
83
27
%
48
%
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
5
6
,2
22
63
,7
91
91
,9
83
13
%
44
%
D
en
m
ar
k
6
0,
62
4
69
,8
16
91
,9
83
15
%
32
%
B
el
g
iu
m
66
,5
3
3
72
,0
18
91
,9
83
8%
28
%
G
re
ec
e
6
9,
45
5
73
,8
50
91
,9
83
6%
25
%
F
ra
n
ce
78
,8
3
0
81
,2
73
91
,9
83
3%
13
%
U
n
it
ed
K
in
gd
om
7
8
,7
95
83
,3
12
91
,9
83
6%
10
%
Ir
el
an
d
48
,2
9
5
83
,7
12
91
,9
83
73
%
10
%
G
er
m
a
n
y
8
0,
98
9
84
,1
08
91
,9
83
4%
9%
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
6
4
,8
00
86
,1
26
91
,9
83
33
%
7%
A
u
st
ri
a
10
3
,8
61
10
6,
58
3
91
,9
83
3%
–1
4%
It
al
y
1
2
7,
71
7
14
4,
08
4
91
,9
83
13
%
–3
6%
A
ve
ra
g
e
6
7
,8
56
77
,1
42
91
,9
83
16
%
31
%
S
o
u
rc
es
:
S
ee
T
ab
le
A
.3
.
44
